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Why does scholarship on transnational labor regulation
(TLR) consistently fail to search for improvements in
working conditions, and instead devotes itself to relentless
efforts for identifying administrative processes, semantics,
and amalgamations of stakeholders? This article critiques
TLR from a pro-worker perspective, through the philosoph-
ical work of Georg Lukács, and the concepts of reification
and commodification. A set of theoretically grounded cri-
teria is developed and these are applied against selected
contemporary cases of TLR. In the totality that is capital-
ism, reification of social relations of production conceals
completely the experiences of workers. In TLR, manageri-
alist and process-oriented scholarship is dominant, verifi-
able outcomes and positive improvements in conditions of
employment are not sought, and worse, meaningless
procedures are celebrated as positive achievements.
1 | INTRODUCTION
More than 11 hundred workers were buried alive and scores of others suffered horrific injuries when
the Rana Plaza sweatshop complex collapsed in Bangladesh in April 2013, the biggest loss of life in
an industrial “accident” since Bhopal. If such loss of life was the result of a terrorist attack in the
United States or Europe, the consequences could have been immense; “coalitions of the willing”
could have been formed and military plans put hastily into action. But the response to the Rana
Plaza disaster was nowhere near as dramatic. There was a sense of shock as pictures of victims bur-
ied in the rubble were circulated in the media, yet “business as usual” quickly prevailed. No candle-
light marches were organized in European capitals, politicians did not address the crowds, and no
memorials were erected for the victims. A few protested outside department stores, but consumers
did not boycott en masse the brands whose labels were found in the ruins of the building. Brands
pushed the responsibility for such calamity to subcontractors and delayed paying compensation to
victims.
It was not the first time that the deaths of low-wage workers in developing countries who produce
want we love to consume made the headlines. In recent years, hundreds if not thousands have
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perished in factory fires, and in social media well-documented stories of sweatshop conditions and
child labor are abound. Alas! there has never before been such a hecatomb. It seems that for many it
is normal and perfectly natural that “fast fashion” and low-priced goods are widely available, and if
thousands of people lose their lives for producing these it is regrettable, but it is not fundamentally a
violation of the natural order of things. More “stuff” continuous to be made under the same working
conditions as before Rana Plaza, in Bangladesh and elsewhere, and workers, like the fast fashion
items they produce, have become commodities that are easily dispensable and disposable.
In this article, we seek to bring to the forefront the workings of capitalism that allow for such
commodification to occur; to explain why we are unable to see beyond the form (and the fetishistic
appeal) of the commodity and realize the social relations of exploitation that are hidden underneath.
In other words, how the human being becomes a mere component of a totalizing capitalist system,
where everything becomes commodified, and how the absolute grip that the system exerts on us is
such that even massacres such as Rana Plaza fail to produce improvements in the livelihoods of
workers (let alone any radical or anticapitalist action extending the democratic control of workers
over the workplace and the economy). On the contrary, as we explain, the outcome of Rana Plaza
was the production of regimes of labor regulation that, further strengthen capitalist control and nor-
malize exploitation in supply chains.
In that respect, we use TLR as our conceptual laboratory, in as much as it offers us the opportu-
nity to observe and expose the weaknesses and complicity of academic scholarship, government
policies and labor market practice. Through direct engagement with the philosophical work of Georg
Lukács and the concepts of reification and commodification, we develop a set of normative and
substantive criteria that are used to analytically examine TLR from a pro-worker perspective. Specifi-
cally, we seek out verifiable improvements in conditions of employment and positive impacts in the
everyday work and life of workers are sought, as a result of a TLR intervention.
The article builds on the extensive literature of transnational labor regulation (TLR) in two ways.
First, it constructs a critique of TLR from a pro-worker perspective, signaling out managerialist dis-
courses. We observe how (and explain why) scholarship on TLR consistently fails to strive for actual
improvements in working conditions and instead devotes itself to relentless efforts for identifying
administrative processes, semantics, and amalgamations of stakeholders. Second, the article enhances
ongoing debates on TLR and labor standards in supply chains (Coslovsky & Locke, 2013; Locke,
Amengual, & Mangla, 2009; Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005), by introducing a critical theoretical perspec-
tive, which so far has been noticeably absent in literature. TLR is a notoroulsly untheoretical field; it
lacks a concrete theoretical perceptive but it is “loaded” with empirical insights and policy perspec-
tives that need the fertile ground of a “big idea” to spread their roots and blossom. Here, we make an
attempt to overcome that deficiency by bringing in philosophical enquiry—Marx and Lukács—to the
forefront and connect scholarship on the regulation of labor with philosophy and social theory, result-
ing in a philosophically and politically informed contribution.
We approach the critique of TLR from a philosophical perspective and draw upon the concepts
of commodification, in a classical Marxian standpoint, and of reification, as introduced by Lukács in
History and Class Consciousness (1923); engaging with debates from the perspectives of political
economy, heterodox economics, labor law, and so on are beyond our purpose and space limitations.
We commence our enquiry by drawing from the Hegelian (come-Marxist) tradition of distin-
guishing between appearance (form) and essence (Reichelt, 2005). We move beyond appearances
and forms of TLR to (re)consider the essence of labor regulation, which rests in the social relations
among producers in supply chains. Consequently, we observe at the very outset of our enquiry the
existence of a fixation on the “mechanics” of labor regulation (Dehnen & Pries, 2014), such as the
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nature of the legal language of international treaties, the inclusion criteria and wording of codes of
conduct, links between stakeholders, the identification and study of administrative processes, the
documentation and dissemination of multi-stakeholder agreements, and various semantics. This focus
on form rarely acknowledges social relations of production and hardly penetrates down to how condi-
tions of employment could actually improve, as a result of TLR mediation.
The question that therefore arises is why are often unable to distinguish beyond the level of the
form, and remain oblivious to social condition of production in supply chains. In this article, we
make an attempt to provide an answer to this challenging question through the concepts of commodi-
fication and reification.
Reification (“reification of consciousness [Verdinglichung des Bewußtseins]” has had a profound
effect on philosophy, as well as on political, social, critical, and literary theories throughout the 20th
century (Bewes, 2002, Chari, 2010, Honneth, Butler, Geuss, Lear, & Jay, 2008). In sharp contrast,
reification has had a limited use in academic discourses of Labor Relations, while direct references to
the philosophical context of reification and the work of Lukács are very rare. Hyman (1975) applied
the term four times throughout his Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction and only in the broad
context of warning against ignoring “the real, active men and women whose activities are industrial
relations” (p. 31), in favor of suggesting that institutions “possess needs, ambitions and problems”
(p. 66). In his analysis of redundancies, Fryer (1973, p. 8) was more revealing and stated that: “by
reification is meant the ascription of essentially human characteristics to abstractions or to social
structures in such a way as to obscure the fundamental part played by human agencies and human
values in social processes.” In doing so, “the paradox of reification is that in ascribing human motiva-
tions to social processes the very products of human activity are apprehended ‘as if they were some-
thing other than human products – such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations
of divine will’ (Berger & Luckman, 1971, p. 106), the dictates of a logic of industrialism, or ‘the need
for the high rate of change demanded by a modern economy’ (3). For those who thus reify the social
world ‘a definite social relation between men ... assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation
between things’ (Marx, 1990, p. 43).”
Distinctively, Tweedie (2013, p. 308) used reification to articulate how “casual work in Australia
tends to be conceptualized as a natural category, and thereby implicitly viewed as an illegitimate sub-
ject of critique.” Further, he showed that Lukács’ account of self-reification explains how precarious
workers’ perceptions of their own status and capabilities are influenced by economic processes, and
how casual academic staff perceived themselves as “not a real staff member” (p. 309). Tweedie saw
Lukács’ work as particularity relevant in explaining the broader discourse of Australian politics,
where labor market practices and policies are portrayed as largely being “determined or constrained
by autonomous international economic systems” (p. 309) and not by historically specific political and
economic choices. Thus, casualization, labor market flexibility, and reforms are taken as normal,
common-sense practices that are beyond criticism. Consequently, national neoliberal economic
policies were assumed as predetermined and necessitated by international economic circumstances
set in motion by “autonomous international economic systems” over which national political elites
have no control (p. 309).
Here, we take over the baton to elaborate and broaden the theoretical analysis of TLR through
Lukácsian and Marxist philosophy. In Section 1, the theoretical foundations of the Lukácsian thought
are laid. That leads in Section 2 to the development of a set of theoretically grounded substantive and
normative criteria for assessing TLR from a pro-worker perspective. In Section 3, these criteria are
applied against an analytical framework that systematically categorizes historical and contemporary
forms of TLR.
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2 | COMMODITY FETISHISM AND REIFICATION
One of the important contributions that Marx made is the recognition that in capitalism the “mysteri-
ous character of the commodity form” (Marx, 1990, p. 164) reflects the social relations that exist
among those who worked for the production of commodities. An object becomes a recognizable
commodity in capitalism not merely through the quantities of labor-time that were dedicated for its
production (a premise introduced by Ricardo), but rather through the recognition of the social rela-
tions that existed among those who were involved in its production. In capitalism, commodities are
not just “stuff,” they are fetishized; people attribute to them almost magical powers that conceal the
social relations that make them commodities. Commodity fetishism characterizes a capitalist society
as production relations are reified: social relations take the form of relations among things. Lukács
(1923) developed further the concept of reification to epitomize the ways in which relations between
human beings are disguised in capitalist societies as relations with and even among things. In that
sense, a commodity in capitalism is primarily a social form and, according to Lukács, the most basic,
fundamental form of a social relationship (here, contra Habermas (1984) and Honneth et al., 2008
we remain faithful to the approach of Lukács that all social relations under capitalism are reified).
Hence, understanding of the commodification process can lead to understanding of the totality of
capitalism. In other words, the drive toward commodification, the drive toward profit and generation
of surplus value is the principle that animates the totality of the capitalist system. This drive leads to
a “perpetually increasing rationalization, to an ever-intensifying exclusion of the qualitative,
individual-human characteristics of the worker” (Lukács, 1923, p. 176). The human element is sys-
tematically excluded and all human endeavors in capitalism are subjected to a “principle of rationality
based on calculation, on calculability” (p. 177) on “quantification of objects” and on their determina-
tion by “abstract thought categories” (p. 291), which function as a “reifying and reified integument”
(p. 293), concealing reality. Thus, “reification in general, [becomes] a fundamental structural phe-
nomenon of the entirety of bourgeois society” (p. 192). The human being becomes a “number”; “a
mechanized component of a mechanical system” (p. 179) and is “broken down...into an element in
the movement of commodities” (p. 292). The human being assimilated into this system becomes a
“helpless spectator” (p. 180), “a cog in the wheel of economic development” (p. 296). “The human
being is objectified as a commodity” (p. 294) and her consciousness becomes “the self-consciousness
of the commodity” (p. 295). The longer people experience capitalism, the more profound the perme-
ation of the “structure of reification” into human consciousness becomes (p. 185). Reification gets to
be engrained on all interpersonal relations and activities without exception and the individual
becomes an object, an anonymous quantity.1
2.1 | The totality of capitalism
According to Lukács, commodification organizes the whole of the society in such a way that is fully
and wholly geared toward one and only purpose: the extraction of as much surplus value as possible
through profit maximization in any way possible (e.g., through an international division of labor,
imperialism, colonialism, increasing efficiency, consolidation of the state to support profit maximiza-
tion) and of course by crushing all resistance to the process of value extraction.
Lukács’ unique contribution consists of providing us with an analytical tool to understand and
challenge the totality of the capitalist system.2 We can have a genuine understanding of the totality of
capitalism insofar as the totality in question is understood both as a subject and an object. Thus,
Lukács suggests that we cannot understand the totality of capitalism by merely looking at individual
facts (e.g., how many workers were laid off, industrial accidents in Bangladesh, methods of labor
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regulation). Individual facts like that have to be understood through the tendencies that underpin and
animate them. In other words, the basic methodological point of Lukács is that we cannot understand
capitalist totality merely as the object of a reflection; there have to be processes that allow for the sub-
ject of the totality of capitalism (the animating principle of it). For both Marx and Lukács that subject
of the capitalist totality is labor, since labor is the source of value and profit. Therefore, for Lukács
only a class that comes into being as the subject of the process of commodification, a class that is at
the source of this process of commodification, its animating principle, would be able to understand
the process itself, precisely because it is the subject that makes that process. That class is the working
class (the proletariat), who find themselves “directly and wholly on the side of the object” and are
“an object and not an active factor in the work process” (Lukács, 1923, pp. 294–295); the proletariat
is the identical subject-object of history (Westerman, 2010).
Lukács uses here a basic principle of Kantian philosophy; we can understand the things that we
make, the ideas that we have, and the forms that we impose on reality. Insofar as it is the proletariat
that is directly or indirectly exploited by capital, and insofar as it is the proletariat that makes reality,
the proletariat can then know reality and can understand reality. Labor has the capacity to become
conscious of capitalist reality, once it reaches a certain point. That “transition” in Lukács is a bit
obscure, but it can be summarized as follows: when history reaches a certain point where commodifi-
cation becomes the totalizing drive of society and the human being has been commodified, the
workers have nothing left but the loss of their humanity. That is, the situation becomes more critical
the more aggressive capitalism becomes and the more crises, “human sacrifices” and Rana Plazas it
demands. Commodification that becomes absolute—that is, “inhuman objectivity” (Lukács, 1923,
p. 307)—is a violation of the humanity of people; once human beings realize this they will resist
commodification. Thus, commodification will drive humanity to a point where humanity can become
conscious of and grasp the process of commodification.
The process of becoming conscious in Lukács should not be confused with sociological
approaches, for example on middle or working-class consciousness. Following the German critical
tradition, for Lukács to become conscious is in the philosophical sense of gaining awareness or gain-
ing an insight into the nature of reality. This kind of awareness leads to an allegiance of either the
position of the dominating in capitalism, the bourgeoisie, or the victim in capitalism, the proletariat.
The critical point that Lukács makes in History and Class Consciousness is that awareness from the
perspective of the exploited gives you an insight into how capitalism actually works and opens the
door to changing the system. On the other hand, the perspective of the person who dominates and
benefits from capitalism does not open up to changing the system; rather this perspective conforms to
capitalism as given, natural, and evident.
Accordingly, from the perspective of the dominant in capitalism it is a consequence of the natural
order of things, albeit regrettably, for people to lose their lives producing the “stuff” we need to be
content; any dissenting voice that would challenge the totality of capitalism is fundamentally illegiti-
mate. The dominant perspective has every interest to reify reality, to conceal, for example, that labor
creates all value and instead portray clever entrepreneurs as the source of wealth! Reification conve-
niently obscures that refusing wage increases to the poorly-paid and super-exploited factory workers
in Bangladesh is an economic choice of the dominant, the result of specific historical and political
conditions, and not an unassailable economic reality. As such, the perspective of the dominant is
notably resilient in academic works and especially in managerialist literature. Consequently, studies
on every conceivable form, mechanism, process and aspect of TLR have indeed been written over
the last few decades, but research focusing on pro-worker outcomes of TLR is hard to come by. This
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is a significant topic that will be analyzed further, but let us first articulate a Lukácsian-inspired per-
spective on TLR and raise a list of criteria that will be used to assess the effectiveness of TLR.
3 | CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING TRANSNATIONAL LABOR
REGULATION
Here, we form a list of substantive and normative criteria for critically evaluating TLR regimes and the
ways these operate in practice, as well as their outcomes (see Table 1). We commence a Lukácsian cri-
tique of TLR from the standpoint of consciousness-raising processes; how workers can become self-
conscious through collective organization. Lukács’ approach on the “what-needs-to-be-done” question
is twofold (Lukács, 2000). On the one hand, there is class struggle and agitation against ideologies,
social institutions, the education system, media, political parties, and institutions of the state that aid
commodification of society and work to advance feelings of atomization and powerlessness among
workers (Lukács, 2000, pp. 14–15). On the other hand, there is worker resistance over the control of
their labor power.3
Consequently, our evaluation of TLR starts with a set of criteria that question how TLR
regimes—and the ways these are implemented—heighten class struggle and promote working-class
emancipation, including international labor solidarity and (anticapitalist) activism.
Second is the question of how TLR may reinforce worker resistance over control of labor power.
Here, trade unions can be decisive in helping progressive policies that aid resistance and solidarity
(Lukács, 2000, p. 15). Therefore, we seek out the emancipatory, pro-union benefits of TLR that veri-
fiably and demonstratively allow for at least the very basic trade union freedoms; the freedom of
association and the right to bargain collectively. These two sets of criteria form our list of substantive
criteria for examining TLR (see Table 1).
Further, we add two more normative elements. The first is based on the observation that reifica-
tion causes the focus of scholarship and research to rest on processes (that is philosophically speaking
the form), and specifically processes that submit to, rather than preclude management. Such process-
oriented (form-focused) scholarship glorifies all bureaucratic and administrative aspects of labor reg-
ulation, but pays little attention to the social relations of production (i.e., philosophically speaking the
essence) that lie beneath. Reification of scholarship and research (and the ways these are funded and
assessed) actively promotes work that seeks to prove how profitable, useful, or ethically desirable for
corporations certain forms of labor regulation can be. Pro-worker outcomes that would bring to the
forefront conditions of employment and social relations of production in supply chains are sidelined,
if not out-rightly ignored (i.e., philosophically speaking reified), as we shall give examples later.
Accordingly, our first normative criterion probes TLR for accounts of social relations of production,
takes a pro-worker perspective, and seeks pro-worker outcomes; specifically—and above all else—
actual, verifiable, and tangible improvements in conditions of employment and positive impacts in
the everyday work and life experiences of workers, as a result of a TLR intervention. Finally, the
TABLE 1 Criteria for evaluating transnational labor regulation
Substantive Normative
Advancement of class struggle, working-class emancipation,
political agitation, and of international labor solidarity and
activism.
Consideration for social relations of production, pro-worker
outcomes, and—above all—actual improvements in conditions
of employment (avoidance of managerialist processes).
Promotion of trade unionism, freedom of association, and right
to collective bargaining.
Neutralization of commodified labor regulation and
nullification of privatization of labor standards.
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second normative criterion centers on the commodification of labor laws and regulation, when (see
below) labor regulation itself becomes “private” (and privatized) and a business solution to be applied
for achieving pro-business results. Appropriately, a critique of TLR needs to grasp the impact of
commodified labor regulation and counteract the privatization of labor standards that is slowly but
certainly taking place.
4 | EVALUATION OF TRANSNATIONAL LABOR REGULATION
We evaluate TLR, using the four aforementioned criteria, against an analytical framework of TLR
(Tsogas, 1999, 2000). Summarized in Table 2, historical and contemporary experiences of TLR are
systematically categorized along a matrix of two regulatory planes and four trade levels. The regula-
tory subjects of TLR are the nation-state and the company and the regulatory objects (the means) of
regulation are “soft” and “hard,” all congregating across four levels of trade relations: unilateral,
bilateral, regional/plurilateral, and multilateral.
Here, the adopted framework has been updated by the addition of recent developments in prison
labor legislation in the United States—under the unilateral level in the hard regulation plane—and
the inclusion of International Framework Agreements (IFAs), under the bilateral level, and European
Works Councils (EWCs), under the regional/plurilateral level in the soft regulation plane. Further,
discussion of each form of TLR is carried out under the light of recent research and developments in
literature.
“Hard” regulation between state actors was the first to emerge (for a historical review see Charno-
vitz, 1987; Hansson, 1983, pp. 11–29). Social clauses in international trade agreements condition
tariff-free (or tariff reduced) access to a market for certain products to the respect for “internationally
recognized” labor standards in the exporting country. Hence, our critique begins at the unilateral level
where trade laws of a country contain social clauses affecting all of its trade relations. Examples
include U.S. laws attempting to prohibit imports produced by child or prison labor. Recently, the
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 amended the U.S. Tariff Act (1930) and
reportedly closed a legal loophole (the “consumptive demand exception” clause) that allowed certain
products made by forced or child labor into the United States, if there was not sufficient supply to
meet domestic demand (Gottwald, 2016). Enforcement is applied through the U.S. Customs and Bor-
der Protection (CBP) that collects petitions from interested parties and may issue a Withhold Release
Order to detain shipments of merchandise. Repeal of the “consumptive demand exception” is per-
ceived as instrumental in enhancing CBP’s ability to prevent products made with forced labor from
being imported into the United States and was heralded as a “full-fledged protection of human rights
in global supply chains” (Gottwald, 2016). However, when considering actual outcomes of the law,
the effectiveness of this amendment is shown to be limited. In all historical and current cases, over a
period of 85 years where the CBP took action, the only bans (temporary or current) that were ever
TABLE 2 An analytical model of transnational labor regulation
Regulatory Level of supply chain and trade relations
Subjects Objects Unilateral Bilateral
Regional/
plurilateral Multilateral
State “Hard”
regulation
Child & prison labor legislation
(USA)
GSP
(USA, EU)
EU
NAFTA
WTO/GATT
ILO
Company “Soft”
regulation
CSR/codes of conduct International
Framework
Agreements
European
Works Councils
UN Global
Compact
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imposed were on products made by convicts in state-run institutions. Whereas forced, bonded, and
child labor are still widespread in global supply chains, if no goods produced under these conditions
were ever banned in the decades prior to the removal of the “consumptive demand exception,” it
seems unlikely that this policy change will have any impact now. Therefore, from a pro-worker view-
point here lays a mere procedural change in law that does not aid the development of trade unions
and freedom of association in exporting countries (neither in the United States), and has little scope
for improvement of working conditions in supply chains.
Next, the bilateral level entails social clauses in trade agreements between one country and a
number of its trading partners. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the United States
and the European Union are by far the most well-known schemes with a social clause. Their labor
market and labor relations’ outcomes have been studied in detail (Compa & Vogt, 2001; Frundt,
1998). It has been claimed (Tsogas, 2001, pp. 359–360) that the existence of social clauses in the
U.S. GSP since 1984 has had a significant impact in the reorientation of the U.S. labor movement; it
enabled the development of international labor solidarity activism in the United States during the late
1980s and throughout the 1990s on an scale previously unknown. A plethora of labor solidarity
groups, human rights organizations, NGOs, church and development groups, and individual activists
committed to the rights of working men and women emerged during this period increasing the space
for international labor solidarity. Significantly, an enormous amount of information, advocacy,
research, and publications (aided by the then expanding internet) emerged on working conditions in
supply chains around the globe. Moreover, experience on how to monitor labor rights violations and
enforce local labor laws in producing countries was also generated. That wealth of information
instructed debates for years to come.
Nonetheless, there was no “game change” situation. Workers’ rights continued to be violated with
increased ferocity in developing countries as globalization deepened. Despite unsupported claims
(Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015, p. 722), TLR debates were not dominated by trade unions and any
involvement of pro-worker groups did not lead to policies tuned toward pro-worker outcomes. Aca-
demic literature on TLR that appeared in large quantities during the 1990s stemmed primarily from
U.S. labor law and trade policy perspectives, including international trade and human rights lawyers
(Alston, 1993; Compa, 1993) and economists and trade theorists (Fields, 1990; Piore, 1990; Sengen-
berger, 1994). It has been claimed (Tsogas, 2001) that the implementation of GSP schemes showed
that in both the United States and Europe foreign policy considerations are paramount; no country
with significant economic and trade ties to the United States or the EU was ever expelled from their
GSPs, regardless of how appalling their labor standards violations had been. Thus, social clauses in
GSPs had mixed outcomes: increased awareness of labor standards in supply chains and their moni-
toring, strengthened international labor solidarity and activism originating in the United States, but
had limited pro-worker outcomes in producing countries.
Next, at the regional and plurilateral level there are social clauses in regional trade agreements
such as the European Union and NAFTA. Labor market outcomes of labor regulation in NAFTA and
the EU have been discussed extensively in literature, whereas immense successes in the EU are not
matched by experiences under NAFTA (Compa, 1995, 1997; Cook & Katz, 1994; Elliot, 2003). We
suggest that the prime reason for that disparity is the enforceability of labor standards. The EU Social
Charter and the various EU Directives are legally enforceable, but nothing like that exists under
NAFTA. A useful lesson in view of Brexit is that without a supranational enforcement system, reli-
ance among signatories of a trade agreement on self-enforcement of labor laws will not “pull”
upward conditions of employment; existing disparities will remain or even extended.
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Worldwide, there were 58 trade agreements that contained labor clauses, in 2013. An Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) report, reflecting on “whether labor provisions have created more
space for improving labor standards and whether the ability to implement existing labor standards
has improved”, quickly concluded: “it goes beyond the scope of this publication to examine these
issues in detail” (ILO, 2015, p. 22). This in itself is a remarkable comment coming from the foremost
world-leading authority entrusted with the promotion of international labor standards. But from our
analytical viewpoint it is not inexplicable.
The ILO was set up in 1919 (in the aftermath of the Soviet revolution in Russia) to provide a
solution for the 19th and early 20th century “social question”; how to dissuade working classes in
developed capitalist economies from becoming radicalized and embracing revolutionary ideas.
Throughout the 20th century, it was seen as an icon of welfare capitalism. With its cornerstones on
class compromise, collective bargaining, and state-sponsored tripartism welfare capitalism (Esping-
Andersen, 1990) worked well for most part of the 20th century and brought economic and social
prosperity to millions of workers in developed economies until neoliberalism started rolling back the
role of the state, and with it, collective bargaining and workers’ rights. Nowadays, such is the depth
of reification of social relations that, even at this level of expertise, the ILO sees it as beyond its scope
to provide evidence on the effectiveness of social clauses in trade agreements in improving the work-
ing lives of people, whose rights these agreements were supposedly set up to protect. Instead, we are
given extensive analyses of the technicalities, procedural, and administrative aspects of the
agreements.
Finally, at the multilateral level are categorized unsuccessful and now defunct efforts to include a
social clause in the World Trade Organization and its predecessor, the GATT (De Wet, 1995; Leary,
1997; Wachtel, 1998; Wolffgang & Feuerhake, 2002). The 1994 Marrakesh agreement that estab-
lished the WTO excluded labor standards from its realm—seemingly once and for all—marked a
watershed on the limits of “hard” regulation. In response, labor activists and NGOs drew their atten-
tion to the supply chains of transnational companies, away from the intergovernmental level of TLR
that characterized GSP, NAFTA, and all state-level forms of labor regulation (French & Winters-
teen, 2009).
Consequently, at the company plane, through “soft” regulation and at the unilateral level of sup-
ply chain relations lay corporate social responsibility (CSR) inspired approaches, including voluntary
corporate or industry codes of conduct, and social labeling and certification schemes (Mamic, 2004;
O'Rourke, 2003; Utting, 2002). As alluded to above, the information on working conditions in supply
chains around the globe that started becoming widely available during the 1990s laid the foundation
for the establishment of a new breed of professional service firms; commercial organizations—acting
beyond the realm of NGOs and solidarity groups—that offer “business solutions” and consultancy
services on social labeling schemes, corporate codes of conduct and other forms of international
social standards. Some, like the organizations behind the AA1000 and SA8000 certification schemes
that emerged during that era, effectively fashioned monitoring and enforcement of labor regulation
on a commercial basis, essentially commercializing—or “privatizing” (O'Rourke, 2006)—workers’
rights and their enforcement (Bartley, 2003, 2007; Büthe & Mattli, 2011). They aim to provide a
ready-made and off-the-shelf approach to labor regulation, on a commercial basis. Ineffective as these
for-profit schemes may be—with questionable or hardly existent (self )enforcement mechanisms—
they are nonetheless being marketed as solutions to the “ineffectiveness” of hard (especially state-
bound) labor regulation.
But, how effective can “soft” regulation be from a pro-worker and trade union perspective?
Lund-Thomsen et al. (2012, p. 1,211) empirically investigated football ball manufacturing in
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Pakistan, India, and China and found that “evidence of gains for workers from compliance with such
standards and codes remains limited and patchy.” Furthermore, the work of Richard Locke and his
research team (Locke, 2013; Locke et al., 2009; Locke, Distelhorst, Pal, & Samel, 2012; Locke,
Kochan, Romis, & Qin, 2007; Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007; Locke, Rissing, & Pal, 2012), provided
decisive insights into this question. Their findings over a ten-year period showed that “the traditional
compliance model of private voluntary regulation, which sought to deter labor violations by policing
and penalizing factories, as well as the alternative capability-building approach that tried to prevent
violations by enabling factories to enforce labor standards on their own, both have serious limita-
tions” (Gereffi, 2014, p. 220). Other research has come to similar conclusions, showing possible but
very temporal improvements in occupational health and safety, working hours, and other outcome
standards (Egels-Zandén, 2007, Frenkel, 2001). But, on the other, there has been limited impact on
process rights such as freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively (Anner, 2012; Bar-
rientos & Smith, 2007; Wang, 2005). Worse—reflecting on the horror of Rana Plaza and similar inci-
dents up to date—after more than a couple of decades of CSR-inspired approaches the evidence—
made by the piled up bodies of buried-alive workers—suggest anything but an improvement; rather a
steep and appalling regression.
Detailed critique of the provisions, workings and effectiveness of the Accord on Fire and Build-
ing Safety and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (the NGO and corporate-led initiatives that
followed Rana Plaza) shows that their ineptness is due to prevailing business-driven CSR, business-
as-usual attitudes, and business models that are fundamentally based on very low-cost production
and human exploitation, with little regard for human life (Centre for Policy Dialogue, 2013; Clean
Clothes Campaign, 2015; Gomes, 2013; Sinkovics, Hoque, & Sinkovics, 2016; Venkatesan, 2013;
Yee, 2015).
Rana Plaza was the biggest loss of life in an industrial “accident” in recent years, and though it
was responded to as appalling, it did not lead to political activism, nor calls for overthrowing capital-
ism, the root-cause of the disaster. Quite to the contrary, it led to the signing of an Accord (a meager
glorified “gentleman’s” agreement) simply on health and safety issues (not on freedom of association
nor any other fundamental workers’ rights) whose enforcement is highly dubious, and very much
within the parameters of global capitalism (Cairola, 2015). In other words, such a grip capitalism and
commodification have upon people and so reified social relations are, that this disaster did not lead to
any realization for radical action, but, to the contrary, to the strengthening of pro-business and funda-
mentally toothless regulation.
For all terms and purposes, the old neoliberal argument that the poor cannot afford labor standards
and collective bargaining rights (as well as “western style” human rights in general; see Tsogas, 1999),
but only the bare minimum of health and safety rules, re-emerged in the Accord and the Alliance. And
it was put into practice—in true neoliberal style—not through an effective, government-sponsored
health and safety regime, but rather through an “independent,” “third-party,” “multi-stakeholder,” (and
corporate controlled) voluntary verification scheme.
The Accord/Alliance is a warning of how privatization of labor regulation may work in the future,
under the “clever” disguise of a multi-stakeholder approach. Such regulation not only does not chal-
lenge the exploitation upon which fast fashion supply chains are based, but it conversely and perhaps
perversely provides legitimacy to the eyes of the stakeholders involved and to the public at large.
That is to say that labels and subcontractors have continued to profit from the blood and toil of their
workers while claiming that they are “taking steps” or even have in place some allegedly robust sys-
tem for avoiding other disasters (a claim that careful examination of implementation procedures and
independent factory inspections can easily disprove). Worse, NGOs could portray such agreements
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as a success that justifies and legitimizes further their involvement in supply chain regulation and aca-
demic researchers could venture to seek for and pronounce as successful the workings of such
schemes (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015, 2018). We call this unfortunate development in TLR as
accordification and distinguish it as a symptom of reification, where meaningless processes are cele-
brated as positive achievements.
Further, let us move to the bilateral level of our framework, stand IFAs (also ambitiously known
in the US as Global Framework Agreements, GFAs), a form of “soft” regulation negotiated between
a multinational company and an international sectoral trade union federation (Riisgaard, 2005; Schö-
mann, Sobczak, Voss, & Wilke, 2008; Thomas, 2011). IFAs emerged in the late 1990s as the institu-
tional trade union response to CSR. Alarmed by declining membership and encroachment of NGOs
into their domain (workers’ rights, labor standards, even representation), trade unions’ way forward
included engaging with multinationals—that is (re)gaining legitimacy (Papadakis, 2011, p. 14) in the
eyes of employers—to safeguard what indeed may be perceived as obvious; respect by employers of
the fundamental rights of their workforce, especially where legal protections and enforcement are
lacking. IFAs were conceived at the very top of trade union bureaucratic structures and negotiated
with senior executives of multinationals; they were neither product of workers’ mobilization nor of
trade union activism. They have attracted considerable attention in contemporary academic literature,
but despite great expectations for promoting workers’ rights their labor market outcomes are hard to
come by. Niforou (2011) showed that IFAs are largely unenforceable across global supply chains and
pleas for future research that would “provide an in-depth examination of the IFA impact” (Niforou,
2014, p. 383). Riisgaard (2005) talked about how “promising” they could be and Thomas (2011,
p. 275) focused on “the capacities of the agreements to bring workers into the process of labor rights
regulation,” that is the “extent to [which] they constitute a shift from a protective approach to labor
rights to one based on empowerment.”
The closest literature has come to provide some evidence of improving conditions of employment
as a result of an IFA/GFA, is with McCallum’s (2013) much-celebrated work. However, a careful
read of the book reveals that actual outcomes have been mixed and very short-lived (see
pp. 148–149); with hardly any positive, lasting impacts that can be attributed to a GFA. Clear posi-
tive effects (meaning going beyond the signing of a trade-union recognition agreement to evidence of
increased wages, better conditions, etc.) according to McCallum have been observed only in Poland,
which received only negligible attention in the book (literally only a line!). But why Poland?
Because, we suggest, Poland as a member of the EU (and in spite of a right-wing nationalist govern-
ment in power) comes under the enabling EU regulatory framework, which in spite of its weakening
in recent years, does still provide the supranational regulatory framework that can “step in” when
national regulation lacks. We suggest that IFAs are fundamentally incapable to affect conditions on
the ground, unless they are strongly linked with dynamic organizing campaigns, that they themselves
are able to produce improved conditions and wages in depth of time. Merely signing an agreement is
far from enough. Implementation is key. As McCallum (2013, p. 146) consents, the success of TLR
“depends on actors enforcing local rules in disparate ways.” But, has not that always be the case?
Thus, beyond calming trade union anxieties about their relevance and generating a voluminous man-
agerialist discourse (mainly on bureaucratic and administrative aspects of labor regulation) that reifies
social relations and exploitation, little positive can be attributed to IFAs/GFAs, not even the ability to
create organizational inroads for unions (Marzán, 2014).
Likewise, regarding EWC, located at the plurilateral level in our framework, little evidence exists
of any positive effects on the employees of the companies in which they operate. Recent literature on
EWCs focuses on broader labor relations’ effects (Pulignano, Lucio, & Walker, 2013), trade-union
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representativeness (Pulignano, 2005, 2006), and procedural aspects (Sydow, Fichter, Helfen,
Sayim, & Stevis, 2014); for example, the typical bureaucratic and administrative aspects of reified
labor regulation, but not on demonstrating any direct positive impact for workers. This lack of pro-
worker focus becomes even more shocking considering that a historically reoccurring theme in the
broader literature on workers’ participation in (management) decision making (a subset of which is
EWCs) is the compulsion to provide evidence of how “useful” for management such schemes are;
for example in increasing company profitability (Levine, 1990), productivity (Ben-Ner & Jones,
1995; Doucouliagos, 1995) and employee satisfaction (Miller & Monge, 1986). In other words, such
is the absoluteness of commodified academic thinking within the reified totality that is capitalism that
academic scholarship deems it worthwhile to prove the credentials of EWCs to management, but not
to workers!
Finally, at the multilateral level of “soft” regulation stands the United Nations’ Global Compact
(UNGC) that aims to regulate the behavior of transnational corporations through the multilateral role
of the UN (Bendell, 2004; Rasche, 2009; Rasche, Waddock, & McIntosh, 2012). In practice, the
completely voluntary nature of the UNGC and the lack of any oversight or implementation mecha-
nism have given rise to new euphemism: “bluewash.” Akin to our familiar greenwash, “bluewashing”
assists companies to appear to be aligned with the humanitarian and peace-seeking role of the UN
and through such perception of an association to receive “an informal stamp of approval and a brand
spillover” that could improve corporate image, but without actually changing their business practices
(Sethi & Schepers, 2014; Wexler, 2013, p. 822).
5 | CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
History and Class Consciousness is the originating text of the entire tradition of Western Marxism.
Reification has been utilized plethorically in political discussions and academic discourses in Arts
and Humanities, except where it is perhaps most relevant: in the world of Work and for unearthing
the social relations that underpin contemporary production in supply chains. This article aims to
reverse that situation and open inroads toward further engagement with critical social theory and
Marxist philosophy in particular, in the field of Labor Relations. Thus, going back to the philosophi-
cal foundations of revolutionary Marxism, we have presented a critique of TLR from an “orthodox”
Marxist perspective. In doing so, we aim to update the dormant Marxist debate in Labor Relations,
and ameliorate the continuing under-theorization of TLR.
Key ideas from Marx and Lukács (commodification and reification) can theoretically explain the
complicity of academic scholarship and the weaknesses of government policies. They can also offer
a critical standpoint that further research can emulate. That is, research that goes beyond conventional
analyses of power relations between capital and labor, competition in international product and labor
markets, neoliberal policies, and the power of transnational corporations, among others, searching
instead for broad overarching themes and theoretical narratives; above all philosophically and politi-
cally informed research that is not hostage to managerialist narratives.
Reification fosters a form of consciousness that fails to distinguish the social relations of domina-
tion. Our purpose here was to go beyond individual explanations of why scholarly research choses
not to, or is even incapable of uncovering unpalatable facts. We searched for societal and systemic
reasons for why—as we observed—research and policy on TLR remain mostly blind (or indifferent)
to horrific abuses, but spends relentless and seemingly senseless effort in searches for bureaucratic
particulars and semantics, and accordifies regulation by hailing hollow processes (empty of positive
pro-worker outcomes) as groundbreaking achievements.
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Inevitably, in this article, we may have only scratched the surface of an enormous and compli-
cated topic. Further research needs to consider the full length of supply chains and the role of infor-
mal markets in developing countries. Apart from the “formal” and visible factories that supply
directly brand labels, there are also numerous smaller factories, back-street workshops and home-
workers; the subcontractors of the formal factories. These workplaces, in spite of their significance
on local economies and peoples’ livelihoods, always escape TLR schemes. Either fully in the infor-
mal economy or in the shadows, by their very nature are beyond legal, regulatory, and often trade
unions’ reach.
Here, we have put forward a fundamental question that merits further research: what are the posi-
tive effects, if any, of TLR schemes on the conditions of employment and daily life experiences of
workers in supply chains? What is the evidence of any demonstrable and verifiable such improve-
ments, as a result of a TLR intervention? While we cannot provide a full alterative, we propose that
the very least TLR schemes should do is to verifiably improve condition of employment in supply
chains. We call for TLR instruments that are legally enforceable and effective, delivering positive
labor standards outcomes. And scholarship should seek ways to verify any positive impacts.
ENDNOTES
1We should not confuse reification with alienation, in their Marxian contexts. The reification of relations is a consequence of
commodification, but not the same as alienation. Alienation is experienced when workers have no rights of ownership over the
price of their labor and indeed no rights over the form and outcome of their labor. But reification is the theory about the social
expression of the expression of relations among workers.
2For an in-depth discussion of the philosophical concept of totality, see Jay, 1986 and for a review of critiques of Lukács’
notion of totality, particularly those elaborated by Lyotard, Althusser, Deleuze, and others from the Italian Autonomist tradi-
tion, see Nir, 2016.
3In the confines of this article, we cannot address the significant matter of the relation between working class self-
consciousness and the role that a Revolutionary Party would play in that process (for a discussion see Westerman, 2010). Here,
we discuss forms of working-class organization from a broader perspective that includes trade unions. In that respect, we admit
guilty of being discerning in adopting selectively elements of Lukács’ thought.
ORCID
George Tsogas https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2080-8747
REFERENCES
Alston, P. (1993). Labor rights provisions in US trade law: ‘Aggressive unilateralism’? Human Rights Quarterly, 15(1), 1–35.
Anner, M. S. (2012). Corporate social responsibility and freedom of association rights: The precarious quest for legitimacy and control
in global supply chains. Politics and Society, 40(4), 609–644. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329212460983
Barrientos, S., & Smith, S. (2007). Do workers benefit from ethical trade? Assessing codes of labor practice in global production sys-
tems. Third World Quarterly, 28(4), 713–729. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590701336580
Bartley, T. (2003). Certifying forests and factories: States, social movements, and the rise of private regulation in the apparel and forest
products fields. Politics and Society, 31(3), 433–464. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329203254863
Bartley, T. (2007). Institutional emergence in an era of globalization: The rise of transnational private regulation of labor and environ-
mental conditions. American Journal of Sociology, 113(2), 297–351. https://doi.org/10.1086/518871
Bendell, J. (2004). Flags of inconvenience? The global compact and the future of the united nations. International Centre for Corporate
Social Responsibility (ICCSR), Research Paper Series, No. 22-2004, Nottingham, UK: ICCSR.
Ben-Ner, A., & Jones, D. C. (1995). Employee participation, ownership, and productivity: A theoretical framework. Industrial Rela-
tions, 34(4), 532–554. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232X.1995.tb00387.x
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1971). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. London: Penguin
University Books.
Bewes, T. (2002). Reification, or, the anxiety of late capitalism. London: Verso.
TSOGAS 529
Büthe, T., & Mattli, W. (2011). The new global rulers: The privatization of regulation in the world economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Cairola, E. (2015). Back to fundamentals: Organizing, collective bargaining and promotion of a decent work framework in global sup-
ply chains. International. Journal of Labor Research, 7(1–2), 9–15.
Centre for Policy Dialogue. (2013). 100 days of Rana plaza tragedy—First independent monitoring report. A report on commitments
and delivery. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Centre for Policy Dialogue.
Chari, A. (2010). Toward a political critique of reification: Lukács, Honneth and the aims of critical theory. Philosophy & Social Criti-
cism, 36(5), 587–606.
Charnovitz, S. (1987). The influence of international labor standards on the world trading regime. A historical overview. International
Labor Review, 126(5), 565–584.
Clean Clothes Campaign (2015). Who has paid and who is dragging their heels. Retrieved from http://www.cleanclothes.org/safety/
ranaplaza/who-needs-to-pay-up
Compa, L. (1993). Labor rights and labor standards in international trade. Law and Policy in International Business, 25(1), 165–191.
Compa, L. (1995). Going multilateral: The evolution of US hemispheric labor rights policy under GSP and NAFTA. Connecticut Jour-
nal of International Law, 10, 337–364.
Compa, L. (1997). Another look at NAFTA. Dissent, 44(1), 45–50.
Compa, L., & Vogt, J. S. (2001). Labor rights in the generalized system of preferences: A 20–year review. Comparative Labor Law
and Policy Journal, 22(2/3), 199–238.
Cook, M. L., & Katz, H. C. (1994). Regional integration and industrial relations in North America. Ithaca: TLR Press.
Coslovsky, S. V., & Locke, R. (2013). Parallel paths to enforcement: Private compliance, public regulation, and labor standards in the
Brazilian sugar sector. Politics and Society, 41(4), 497–526.
De Wet, E. (1995). Labor standards in the globalized economy: The inclusion of a social clause in the general agreement on tariff and
trade/world trade organization. Human Rights Quarterly, 17(3), 443–462.
Dehnen, V., & Pries, L. (2014). International framework agreements as a thread in the texture of transnational labor regulation.
European Journal of Industrial Relations, 20(4), 335–350.
Doucouliagos, C. (1995). Worker participation and productivity in labor-managed and participatory capitalist firms: A meta-analysis.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 49(1), 58–77.
Egels-Zandén, N. (2007). Suppliers’ compliance with MNC’s codes of conduct: Behind the scenes at Chinese toy suppliers. Journal of
Business Ethics, 75(1), 45–62.
Elliot, K. A. (2003). Labor standards and the free trade area of the Americas. Institute for International Economics, Working Paper
03-7. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
Fields, G. S. (1990). Labor standards, economic development, and international trade. In S. Herzenberg & J. Perez-Lopez (Eds.), Labor
standards and development in the global economy (pp. 19–34). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Interna-
tional Labor Affairs.
French, J. D., & Wintersteen, K. (2009). Crafting an international legal regime for worker rights: Assessing the literature since the
1999 Seattle WTO Protests. International Labor and Working-Class History, 75, 145–168.
Frenkel, S. (2001). Globalization, athletic footwear commodity chains and employment relations in China. Organization Studies,
22(4), 531–562.
Frundt, H. J. (1998). Trade conditions and labor rights: US initiatives, Dominican and central American responses. Gainesville, FL:
University Press of Florida.
Fryer, R. H. (1973). Redundancy, values, and public policy. Industrial Relations Journal, 4(2), 2–19.
Gereffi, G. (2014, 2013). On Richard M. Locke, The promise and limits of private power: Promoting labor standards in a global econ-
omy. In Socio-economic review (Vol. 12, pp. 219–235). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Gomes, W. (2013). Reason and responsibility: The Rana plaza collapse. OpenDemocracy. Retrieved from https://www.
opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/william-gomes/reason-and-responsibility-rana-plaza-collapse
Gottwald, E. (2016). Tariff Act strengthened, but will enforcement follow? International Labor Rights Forum (TLRF). Retreived from
http://www.laborrights.org/blog/201602/tariff-act-strengthened-will-enforcement-follow
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action. Vol. 1: Reason and the rationalization of society. Boston, MA: Beacon
Press.
Hansson, G. (1983). Social clauses and international trade. London: Croom Helm.
Honneth, A., Butler, J., Geuss, R., Lear. J., & Jay, M. (2008). Reification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hyman, R. (1975). Industrial relations: A Marxist introduction. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
International Labor Organisation (ILO). (2015). Studies on growth with equity. Social dimensions of free trade agreements.
Geneva: ILO.
Jay, M. (1986). Marxism and totality: The adventures of a concept from Lukács to Habermas. Berkley, CA: University of California
Press.
Leary, V. A. (1997). The WTO and the social clause: Post-Singapore. European Journal of International Law, 8(1), 118–122.
Levine, D. I. (1990). Participation, productivity, and the firm’s environment. California Management Review, 32(4), 86–100.
530 TSOGAS
Locke, R. (2013). The promise and limits of private power: Promoting labor standards in a global economy. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Locke, R., Amengual, M., & Mangla, A. (2009). Virtue out of necessity? Compliance, commitment, and the improvement of labor con-
ditions in global supply chains. Politics and Society, 37(3), 319–351.
Locke, R., Distelhorst, G., Pal, T., & Samel, H. M. (2012). Production goes global, standards stay local: Private regulation in the
global electronics industry. MIT Political Science Department Working Paper No. 2012-1. Retreived from http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1978908
Locke, R., Kochan, T., Romis, M., & Qin, F. (2007). Beyond corporate codes of conduct: Work organization and labor standards at
Nike’s suppliers. International Labor Review, 146(1-2), 21–40.
Locke, R., Qin, F., & Brause, A. (2007). Does monitoring improve labor standards? Lessons from Nike. Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 61(1), 3–31.
Locke, R., Rissing, B. A., & Pal, T. (2012). Complements or substitutes? Private codes, state regulation and the enforcement of labor
standards in global supply chains. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 51(3), 519–552.
Lukács, G. (1923). History and class consciousness. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Lukács, G. (2000). A defense of history and class consciousness: Tailism and the dialectic. London: Verso.
Lund-Thomsen, P., Nadvi, K., Chan, A., Khara, N., & Xue, H. (2012). Labor in global value chains: A comparative study of workers’
conditions in football manufacturing in China, India and Pakistan. Development and Change, 43(6), 1211–1237.
Mamic, I. (2004). Implementing codes of conduct: How business manage social performance in global supply chains. Geneva and
Sheffield: ILO and Greenleaf Publishing.
Marx, K. (1990). Capital: A critique of political economy (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Penguin.
Marzán, C. F. R. (2014). Organizing with international framework agreements. University of California Irvine Law Review, 4(2),
725–780.
McCallum, J. (2013). Global unions, local power: The new spirit of transnational labor organizing. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Miller, K. I., & Monge, P. R. (1986). Participation, satisfaction, and productivity: A meta-analytic review. Academy of Management
Journal, 29(4), 727–753.
Niforou, C. (2011). International framework agreements and industrial relations governance: Global rhetoric versus local realities.
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 50(2), 352–373.
Niforou, C. (2014). International framework agreements and the democratic deficit of global labor governance. Economic and Indus-
trial Democracy, 35(2), 367–386.
Nir, O. (2016). Lukács today: Totality, labor, and fantasies of revenge. Rethinking Marxism, 28(2), 154–170.
O'Rourke, D. (2003). Outsourcing regulation: Analyzing nongovernmental systems of labor standards and monitoring. Policy Studies
Journal, 31(1), 1–29.
O'Rourke, D. (2006). Multi-stakeholder regulation: Privatizing or socializing global labor standards?World Development, 34(5), 899–918.
Papadakis, K. (2011). Shaping global industrial relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan/ILO.
Piore, M. J. (1990). Labor standards and business strategies. In S. Herzenberg & J. Perez-Lopez (Eds.), Labor standards and develop-
ment in the global economy (pp. 35–49). Washington, DC: US Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs.
Pulignano, V. (2005). EWCs and cross-national employee representative coordination. A case of trade union cooperation? Economic
and Industrial Democracy, 26(3), 383–412.
Pulignano, V. (2006). Still ‘regime competition’? Trade unions and multinational restructuring in Europe. Relations Industrielles/Indus-
trial Relations, 61(4), 615–638.
Pulignano, V., Lucio, M. M., & Walker, S. (2013). Globalization, restructuring and unions: Transnational co-ordination and varieties
of labor engagement. Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, 68(2), 261–289.
Rasche, A. (2009). ‘A necessary supplement’: What the United Nations global compact is and is not. Business & Society, 48(4),
511–537.
Rasche, A., Waddock, S., & McIntosh, M. (2012). The United Nations global compact: Retrospect and prospect. Business & Society,
52(1), 6–30.
Reichelt, H. (2005). Social reality as appearance: some notes on Marx's conception of reality. In W. Bonefeld & K. Psychopedis
(Eds.), Human Dignity. Social autonomy and the critique of capitalism: 31–67. Aldershot, England & Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Publishing.
Reinecke, J., & Donaghey, J. (2015). After Rana Plaza: Building coalitional power for labor rights between unions and (consumption--
based) social movement organizations. Organization, 22(5), 720–740.
Reinecke, J., & Donaghey, J. (2018). When industrial democracy meets corporate social responsibility. A comparison of the
Bangladesh accord and alliance as responses to the Rana Plaza disaster. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 56(1), 14–42.
Riisgaard, L. (2005). International framework agreements: A new model for securing workers rights? Industrial Relations, 44(4),
707–737.
Rodríguez-Garavito, C. A. (2005). Global governance, cross-border organizing, and labor rights: Codes of conduct and anti-sweatshop
struggles in global apparel factories in Mexico and Guatemala. Politics and Society, 33(2), 203–333.
Schömann, I., Sobczak, A., Voss, E., & Wilke, P. (2008). Codes of conduct and international framework agreements: New forms of
governance at company level. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
TSOGAS 531
Sengenberger, W. (1994). Restructuring at the global level: The role of international labor standards. In W. Sengenberger &
D. Campbell (Eds.), Creating economic opportunities: The role of labor standards in industrial restructuring (pp. 395–418).
Geneva: ILO.
Sethi, P. S., & Schepers, D. H. (2014). United Nations global compact: The promise–performance gap. Journal of Business Ethics,
122(2), 193–208.
Sinkovics, N., Hoque, S. F., & Sinkovics, R. R. (2016). Rana plaza collapse aftermath: Are CSR compliance and auditing pressures
effective? Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 29(4), 617–649.
Sydow, J., Fichter, M., Helfen, M., Sayim, K. Z., & Stevis, D. (2014). Implementation of global framework agreements: Towards a
multi-organizational practice perspective. Transfer: European Review of Labor and Research, 20(4), 489–503.
Thomas, M. P. (2011). Global industrial relations? Framework agreements and the regulation of international labor standards. Labor
Studies Journal, 36(2), 269–287.
Tsogas, G. (1999). Labor standards in international trade agreements: An assessment of the arguments. The International Journal of
Human Resource Management, 10(2), 351–375. https://doi.org/10.1080/095851999340594
Tsogas, G. (2000). Labor standards in the generalized systems of preferences of the European Union and the United States. European
Journal of Industrial Relations, 6(3), 349–370. https://doi.org/10.1177/095968010063006
Tsogas, G. (2001). Labor regulation in a global economy. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Tweedie, D. (2013). Precarious work and Australian labor norms. The Economic and Labor Relations Review, 24(3), 297–315.
Utting, P. (2002). Voluntary approaches to corporate responsibility. Geneva: United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service.
Venkatesan, R. (2013). Clothing garment workers in safety: The case of Bangladesh. Economic and Political Weekly, 48(48), 13.
Retreived from http://www.epw.in/journal/2013/28/web-exclusives/clothing-garment-workers-safety-case-bangladesh.html
Wachtel, H. (1998). Labor’s stake in the WTO. The American Prospect, 37, 34–38.
Wang, H. Z. (2005). Asian transnational corporations and labor rights: Vietnamese trade unions in Taiwan-invested companies. Jour-
nal of Business Ethics, 56(1), 43–53.
Westerman, R. (2010). The reification of consciousness: Husserl's phenomenology in Lukács’s identical subject-object. New German
Critique, 37(3), 97–130.
Wexler, L. (2013). Extralegal whitewashes. DePaul Law Review, 62(3), 817–855.
Wolffgang, M. H., & Feuerhake, W. (2002). Core labor standards in world trade law: The necessity for incorporation of core labor
standards in the World Trade Organization. Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 883–901.
Yee, A. (2015). Two years after Rana plaza, are Bangladesh’s workers still at risk? The Nation. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.
com/article/two-years-after-rana-plaza-are-bangladeshs-workers-still-risk/
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
GEORGE TSOGAS has published articles and a book on transnational labor standards. His
research seeks new theoretical insights on work, value, commodification and labor regulation,
drawing from Marxist philosophy and critical social theory.
How to cite this article: Tsogas G. Transnational labor regulation, reification, and commodi-
fication: A critical review. Labor and Society. 2018;21:517–532. https://doi.org/10.1111/lands.
12362
532 TSOGAS
